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Abstract
Title

of

Degree:

Dissertation:

Maritime casualty investigation in Jordan; current
implementation of IMO standards and future development

Master of Science

This study aims to identify the extent of the current implementation of the Maritime
Casualty Investigation Code in Jordan and future development. Therefore, to study this
topic, several questions were put forward to focus on the objective of this study. A legal
and descriptive approach is used to answer the study questions; a descriptive and legal
approach was used by reviewing IMO legal instruments and Jordan legislation with
respect to marine Casualty Investigation Code. Various previous studies and articles
highlight other States differ in the way they implement their international obligations in
relation to the provisions of the Casualty Investigation Code. Moreover, an analysis was
made using the SWOT tool to identify the gaps between the current implementation and
the expected implementation as a standard measures obligation. The results indicate
inadequacies in the current implementation of international and national casualty
investigation legislation in Jordan. Despite, the extensive efforts made by Jordan to
ratify all the international instruments in respect to marine casualty investigation.

Keywords: Casualty Investigation Code, Marine Safety Investigation, Current
implementation, Investigation Methodologies, Marine casualty process, Future
development, Investigation report.
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1.
1.1

Chapter One Introduction

Background
Aqaba is a city located in the southern part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,

which is about 330 kilometers from the capital Amman to the south. In 2001, it was
transformed into the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) becoming central access,
with three continents Africa, the Middle East and West Asia intersecting and
establishing a global axis for investors and tourists alike (ASEZA, 2017). The region
extends to the borders of Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt's territorial waters and lies on
the Gulf of Aqaba, which flows into the Red Sea (Gladstone, Facey, & Hariri, 2006). It
forms a strategic entrance for regional and international markets. The age of the port of
Aqaba is linked to the age of the city itself, which dates back to the thirteenth century
BC (ASEZA, 2017).
The Gulf of Aqaba is the link between the Far East, India and the Middle East
without the need to go through the Suez Canal, which is located on latitude (29.31) north
and longitude (35.01) east in the Gulf of Aqaba. Moreover, the only port access to
Jordan has great economic importance due to it’s commercial, industrial and tourist
activities (Aqaba Port, 2019).
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The port of Aqaba one of the most important elements in the maritime transport
activities and a major center for Jordanian maritime trade activity. The port of Aqaba has
a prominent role in the development of the Jordanian economy and to the transiting
cargo of neighboring countries and this is evident through the active trade movement
carried out in the port system (Ministry of Transport, 2017)
The Gulf of Aqaba is a commercially active area, including the transport of
passengers and goods by sea. Thus, it is vulnerable to maritime casualties, which could
threaten the safety of life and the marine environment. Therefore, it is necessary for
experts to conduct a marine casualty investigation and identify the causes and factors of
the casualty through investigating the technical, legal, and administrative aspects in the
ship (JMC, 2019).
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) was formally established in 1948,
through an international conference in Geneva under the name Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) to deal with shipping matters (IMO, 2019).
IMO as an international organization has developed many international instruments such
as conventions, protocols as international legislative provisions and international
controls, and resolutions as a non-binding way to help the member States to achieve the
requirements of saving lives, and protecting the marine environment (IMO, 2019).
IMO is a regulatory body for one hundred and seventy-four member States that
have their sovereignty and have ratified the international instruments with common high
standards for all these member States (Amin, McDevitt, & Gibbs, 2018). The rapid
increase in the volume of maritime trade in Jordan is putting an enormous obligations on
Jordan to ensure safety in the Jordanian territorial waters and ships that fly the Jordanian
flag wherever they exist (JMC, 2019).
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1.2

Research Questions
This study will highlight marine casualty investigation in Jordan, including the

current implementation of IMO standards. Moreover, it will try to find opportunities for
improvement and development by going through national legislation. In addition, it will
define the gap between the implementation and the best practice to fulfil the maritime
administration’s obligations in Jordan with respect to the Casualty Investigation Code.
By focusing on the objectives, the key research questions are:
 What is the state of the art in Jordan as regards the IMO Casualty Investigation
Code’s implementation and application?
 What are the practical challenges before and after the IMO Member State Audit
Scheme (IMSAS) audit to identify the key areas for improvement?
 What are the pathways to fix the current status of such regulations in Jordan
and meet the obligations of the Casualty Investigation Code?

1.3

Objectives and Aims
The essential goal of this research is to provide a wider perspective of the

deficiencies faced in the current implementation of IMO legislation on casualty
investigation and then identify the potential for development in Jordan.
The objectives of the study are as follow:
 To analyze and evaluate the current practice of the Casualty Investigation Code
and the national policy in Jordan;
 To identify the practical challenges before and after IMSAS audit to identify
the key areas for improvement;
 To highlight the gap through an analysis of the current status in Jordan and
what should be applied to meet its obligation as a Member State for “future
development”.
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1.4

Methodology
This study utilizes the legal-normative approach while going through the primary

resources of all relevant legal instruments. Such as conventions, codes, resolutions and
publications of IMO in respect to marine casualty investigation. In addition, the national
law, regulations that imposed to implement the marine casualty investigation in Jordan.
Moreover, the study refers to secondary resources of data analysis. A large volume of
sources of available data from public documents and official records, annual reports
from JMC and all their maritime stakeholders. Primary and secondary sources of data
from pertinent reports, articles, official websites, and books were utilized to highlight the
challenges that faced by Jordan and other factors that influenced the current
implementation of IMO legislation in Jordan’s maritime administration in casualty
investigation.
Hence, the critical analysis and the results will be used to find the gaps, link the
regulations in Jordan to the corresponding IMO legislations. The SWOT analysis tool
and descriptive analysis are applied to look at different factors. In addition, interviews
are the guiding methods used in this study.
Overall, any research involves ethical issues, and this research studies confidential
reports and documents. Therefore, the ethical issues will be dealt with as per the
regulations of World Maritime University (WMU) and the concerned authorities.

1.5

Dissertation Structure
In order to achieve the main aim of this dissertation, the research consists of the

following six chapters (see Figure 1):
Chapter one will cover the comprehensive background of the research and
present the problems related to the chosen topic. These research questions seek to
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identify the gaps between the current status of casualty investigation in Jordan and
optimal implementation of the international instruments dealing with the topic.
Chapter two will highlight the interaction between the international instruments
that contain the legal framework for maritime casualty investigations, and the legal and
institutional framework of Jordan as a sovereign country.
Chapter three employs different sources for different States in terms of how
they set out the marine casualty investigation concepts, process and models into their
national legislations. This will help to know if Jordan legislation reflects a better
understanding of the marine casualty investigation concept.
Chapter four presents the factors that contribute to accomplishing a marine
casualty investigation in a successful way. This chapter will address whether these
factors are present in Jordan´s legislation and enforcement machinery in a manner
capable of fulfilling international obligations.
Chapter five will provide the findings of the SWOT analytical tool applied to
the current situation of the casualty investigation implementation in Jordan in order to
learn about the potential for future development in Jordan.
Chapter six will present the conclusion and recommendations based on the
findings presented in Chapter five in order to improve the current performance in Jordan
with respect to marine casualty investigation.
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Figure 1The dissertation structure

The next Chapter discusses the international and institutional legal framework
that regulates marine casualty investigation in Jordan. In addition, the interaction
between the international instruments and the institutional framework will be
highlighted clearly to show how the regulatory framework appears with respect to its
current implementation in Jordan.
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2.

Chapter 2 International and Institutional Legal Framework

The interaction at the national level among the constitutional requirements of the
State and international conventions and treaties has enormous implications for the
maritime governance of all States (Mukherjee & Brownrigg, 2013). The implication
such as ratifying the IMOs’ conventions and treaties requires the State to enact the
legislations that are harmonious with their national needs and in the same time to meets
their international obligation (Mukherjee & Brownrigg, 2013). Therefore, to measure the
effectiveness of the performance of States in meeting their international obligations.
IMO has adopted a mechanism to evaluate the performance periodically concerning its
obligations as a maritime administration, the extent of implementation and enforcement
of the IMO instruments (IMO, 2013).
Consequently, this Chapter will address the international instruments imposed
by IMO and other international organizations that regulate marine casualties. On the
other hand, how Jordan respond to these international instruments by forming the legal
and institutional framework to ensure maritime safety and avoid recurrence of accidents
in the future, which will be discussed as well. Moreover, will be highlighted how Jordan
respond to IMO mechanism to measure the maritime administration performance with
respect to the marine casualty as Jordan obligations.
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2.1

International Instruments
A series of maritime accidents have occurred over the past 100 years and have

forced the international maritime community to adopt international conventions on
safety responsibility and environmental protection (Ibn Awal & Hasegawa, 2017). Over
decades, IMO has made significant efforts to improve and ensure a high and effective
standard in regard to safety, considering marine accidents and their prevention a main
driver of the many instruments issued and activities undertaken by IMO (IMO, 2019). A
remarkable series of conventions and other essential instruments, protocols,
amendments, recommendations, codes, guidelines and resolutions that are making
shipping safer, simpler and more standardized (IMO, 2019).
The act of ratification is binding, and obligates member States to implement the
instruments. In terms of casualty investigation, each member State is obligated to take
the necessary measures, in respect of its legislative environment, to undertake
investigations into marine accidents. This is an obligation according to the article 94 of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982 (UN, 1982).
IMO has focused its concern on maritime safety investigations and their results
through a remarkable series of conventions (Figure 2) such as; the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974, as amended (SOLAS). The International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 (MARPOL), as modified by
the Protocol of 1978 relating there to, and by the Protocol of 1997. The International
Convention on Load Lines 1966 (LL). Other essential instruments, such as protocols,
codes, guidelines and resolutions make shipping safer, simpler and more standardized,
by governing the marine casualty investigation process (IMO, 2019).
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Figure 2 IMO conventions and resolutions related to casualty investigation
Source: (IMO, 2019)

After sinking of Titanic accident in 1912, SOLAS Convention was adopted by
international cooperation after two years in 1914 as the first initiative on safety
regulations. SOLAS was replaced with many updated versions up to the last one SOLAS
Convention 1974 (Ibn Awal & Hasegawa, 2017). IMO has set requirements for the
investigation in Regulation 21 - Causalities of the SOLAS Convention 1974, says:
“(a) Each Administration undertakes to conduct an investigation of any casualty
occurring to any of its ships subject to the provisions of the present Convention
when it judges that such an investigation may assist in determining what changes
in the present regulations might be desirable.
(b) Each Contracting Government undertakes to supply the Organization with
pertinent information concerning the findings of such investigations. No reports
or recommendations of the Organization based upon such information shall
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disclose the identity or nationality of the ships concerned or in any manner fix or
imply responsibility upon any ship or person” (IMO, 1974).
The accident of oil spill off from The Torrey Canyon on French and Cornish
coasts in 1967, call the international maritime community to MARPOL Convention and
was adopted in 1973 (Ibn Awal & Hasegawa, 2017). MARPOL Convention is defined
the marine accident from the environment perspective, Article 2 – Definition of The
MARPOL Convention 1973, says:
“(6). "Incident" means an event involving the actual or probable discharge into
the sea of a harmful substance, or effluents containing such a substance” (IMO,
2006).
In addition, the MARPOL Convention specified the States obligations to
investigate any casualty may harme the marine environment. Article 12 - Casualties to
ships, says:
“(1). Each Administration undertakes to conduct an investigation of any casualty
occurring to any of its ships subject to the provisions of the regulations if such
casualty has produced a major deleterious effect upon the marine environment.
(2). Each Party to the Convention undertakes to supply the Organization with
information concerning the findings of such investigation, when it judges that
such information may assist in determining what changes in the present
Convention might be desirable” (IMO, 2006).
Similarly, IMO addresses marine accident investigation in the LL Convention
1966. Article 23 – Casualties of LL Convention 1966, say:
“(1) Each Administration undertakes to conduct an investigation of any casualty
occurring to ships for which it is responsible and which are subject to the
provisions of the present 13 Convention when it judges that such an investigation
may assist in determining what changes in the Convention might be desirable.
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(2) Each Contracting Government undertakes to supply the Organization with
the pertinent information concerning the findings of such investigations. No
reports or recommendations of the Organization based upon such information
shall disclose the identity or nationality of the ships concerned or in any manner
fix or imply responsibility upon any ship or person”. (IMO, 2005)
In addition, IMO adopted a resolution on 25 November 1999, and it is an
amendment of the Code for the investigation of marine casualties and incidents
(Resolution A.849 (20)) (IMO, 2000). The role that this resolution plays is to enhance
preventative measures by offering practical advice for the investigation of human factors
in marine casualties (IMO, 2000). Moreover, it calls all the States to improve the quality
of marine investigation reports and complete the reports as soon as practicable (IMO,
2000).
IMO realized the need to adopt a common approach in conducting maritime
safety casualty investigations to prevent casualties in the future. Therefore, IMO adopted
resolution MSC.255 (84) on 16 May 2008, the international standards and recommended
practices for a safety investigation into a marine casualty or marine incident (Casualty
Investigation Code) (IMO, 2008). IMO has designed this instrument as a guide to
conducting marine casualty investigations and to regulating and standardizing the
investigation mechanism for flag States and coastal States to follow (IMO, 2008).
IMO adopted, on 4 December 2013, Resolution A.1075 (28) and its guidelines to
assist investigators in the implementation of the casualty investigation code (Resolution
MSC.255 (84)) (IMO, 2014). Despite the best of IMO's endeavors for the purpose of
enhancing the safety of life at sea and protecting the marine environment, accidents
resulting in loss of life and ships and pollution of the marine environment, continue to
occur (IMO, 2014). Therefore, recognizing that remedial measures to reduce maritime
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accidents are the best solution, IMO emphasizes the training of investigators and
analysis of the sequence of events to identify casualty occurrence. Moreover, IMO
stresses the need for cooperation among States to investigate maritime accidents in order
to determine their circumstances and causes (IMO, 2014) this resolution revokes both
resolutions A.849 (20) and A.884 (21) (IMO, 2014).
It is worth pointing out that the abovementioned instruments are not the only
ones being adopted by IMO. IMO has also worked hard to adopt other applicable
instruments, for example, the IMO circulation (MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.3) was issued on 18
December 2008. In this instrument, which requires the States to report the casualty
investigations to IMO. In addition, IMO has adopted other instruments to conduct audits
of the maritime administrations to verify their compliance with the requirements of the
international conventions (IMO, 2013).
The States may obtain some benefits by implementing IMO instruments, in
particular the enhancing of maritime safety and security and the prevention of pollution
from ships. However, these benefits can only be fully obtained when the member States
implement the obligations as required under the related instruments (IMO, 2013).
Therefore, IMO has designed key performance indicators (KPI's) to assist the
member States in adopting and implementing the conventions to improve maritime
safety and environmental protection. Thus, IMO completed the legal framework of the
mandatory IMSAS in May 2014 (IMO, 2019). Moreover, IMO adopted the IMO
Instruments Implementation Code (III Code) through a resolution A.1070 (28) which
came into force on 1 January 2016. This code is focused on the three key aspects for a
maritime organization (IMO, 2013). These key aspects are implementation, enforcement
and review. Each member State needs to evaluate its performance periodically
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concerning its obligations as a flag State, port State and coastal State and the extent of
implementation and enforcement of the IMO instruments (IMO, 2013).
Overlooking the main role of the other international organizations to ensure
maritime safety and security is difficult. Therefore, a significant venture was made by
the International Labor Organization (ILO), to ensure seafarers rights and to achieve
decent working conditions on board ship. Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) was
adopted in 2006 and entered into force in 2013, as legal instruments in the international
maritime regime (Adăscăliţeia, 2014). Regulation 5.1.6 on Marine Causalities of MLC
Convention 2006, says:
“1. Each Member shall hold an official inquiry into any serious marine casualty,
leading to injury or loss of life, that involves a ship that flies its flag. The final
report of an inquiry shall normally be made public.
2. Members shall cooperate with each other to facilitate the investigation of
serious marine casualties referred to in paragraph 1 of this Regulation” (ILO,
2006).
As the previous part elaborated the legal instruments in the international scope
regarding the marine casualty investigation. The next part of this chapter will discuss the
legal and institutional framework of the maritime administration in Jordan. By focusing
on the hard dimension which is the legal framework, and the soft dimension which is the
institutional framework in light of its interaction among the international instruments
that decreed by the international organizations, and the national needs.

2.2

Legal and Institutional Framework in Jordan
By Jordan Maritime Commission Law No. 46 for the year 2006. A national

government entity with legal, financial and administrative authority was established in
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Jordan, called the Jordan Maritime Commission (JMC), which is linked to the Ministry
of Transport (MOT). JMC plays the role of maritime administration in Jordan (JMC,
2006).
Policy development precedes the issuance of legislation, including regulations
and instructions (Mukherjee & Brownrigg, 2013). In policy development, the purpose is
not always to enact legislation to implement a specific policy initiative of the
government or to promote and protect national preferences. In some cases, member
States should meet the legal obligation arising out of the international instruments.
Therefore, the member States seek to transform the international instruments into
national legislation (Mukherjee & Brownrigg, 2013).

2.2.1

The Legal Framework
According to Article 4 of JMC Law 46, JMC primarily aims to effectively and

efficiently regulate, supervise to improve the maritime sector including, all modes of
transportation, stationary and moving equipment, labor force, and associated services.
JMC Law 46 also provides guidance to implement Jordan’s economic and social plans in
conformity with the provisions of Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA)
Law. Furthermore, it enhances the private sector's role in contributing to improve and
develop the maritime sector. Simultaneously, it encourages competition and prevents
monopoly in the sector. Finally, it provides support for the protection of the marine
environment by boosting maritime safety standards (JMC, 2006).
In order to achieve the above-mentioned objectives, JMC shall perform several
functions, including as per paragraph H, in Article 5 of JMC Law 46, which further
elaborates the investigation of maritime accidents and catastrophes within Jordanian
territorial waters and on Jordanian ships (JMC, 2006).
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JMC has worked hard to establish a legal framework to realize the
abovementioned objectives. To this end, technical instructions are issued taking into
account the international law in order to meet international standards. These regulations
and guidelines at the national level reflect what Jordan has committed to as a member
State of the United Nations (UN), since 14 December 1955 (UN, 2019). Similarly,
Jordan is a member State in IMO and a signatory to international maritime conventions,
since 1973 (IMO, 2019). According to article 9 of the JMC Law 46, the Board of JMC
shall conduct several functions and terms of reference, including paragraph K in article
9, JMC Law 46, which authorizes JMC to prepare and enact the instructions for the
administration’s procedures and operations (JMC, 2006).
In this context, Jordan has a significant interest in adopting all IMO instruments
related to casualty investigation affairs. The section below will review the JMC
instructions issued to meet the main vital IMO instruments to elaborate JMC’s legal
framework in casualty investigation matters. The relevant regulations are taken from
different conventions.
JMC ratified the SOLAS Convention on 10 October 2006 (JMC, 2019). JMC
Instructions for Implementing (SOLAS) have been issued by JMC to comply with
SOLAS Convention, 1974 in marine casualty matters, in which it stated that JMC should
conduct an investigation into any incident involving any ship belonging to it and subject
to the provisions of the Convention (JMC, 2006).
JMC has acquired the obligation to implement and fulfil the requirements of the
Casualty Investigation Code through the signing of the SOLAS Convention. Therefore,
JMC issued an instruction called “Instructions to Implement the Maritime Accidents and
Incidents Investigation Code” (JMC, 2017) hereinafter called Instructions 2017.
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In addition, JMC has made an intensive effort to develop measures to improve
maritime safety and to conduct maritime investigations according to the MARPOL
Convention. JMC signed the MARPOL convention on 2 September 2006 (JMC, 2019);
JMC Instructions for Applying the Annexes of MARPOL of 1973 and its Amendments
have been issued by JMC to comply with MARPOL Convention in marine casualty
matters (JMC, 2006).
Similarly, JMC ratified the LL Convention on 17 August 2000 (JMC, 2019).
JMC issued the Instructions for Implementing the International Convention on Load
Lines of 1966 and it is Protocol of 1988 for the year (2014), to comply with this
convention. Article 13 from the LL instruction 2014, states that JMC may investigate
any incident involving ships for which it is responsible and subject to the provisions of
the LL Convention when it deems that such an investigation may help identify possible
changes to the convention. Moreover, JMC shall provide the IMO with the relevant
information concerning the results of such investigations, provided that the reports or
recommendations to IMO based on such information do not reveal the identity or
nationality of the ships concerned or assume responsibility in any way for a ship or a
person or even hint at it (JMC, 2014).
In addition, JMC has not overlooked its accession to the MLC Convention.
Therefore, a royal decree was issued to approve the Prime Minister’s decision 6276
dated on 5 November 2014. This official decision approved Jordan's accession to the
Convention (JMC, 2014). Moreover, JMC has issued Instructions for the application of
the MLC in response to the ratification on 16 February 2017, to comply with MLC 2006
in marine casualty matters and to achieve decent work for seafarers (JMC, 2017).
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2.2.2

The Institutional Framework
Usually, the substantive elements of the maritime policy are largely built on

marine environment, maritime safety and security concerns. Admittedly, the policy
begins at the top functional levels of management (Mukherjee & Brownrigg, 2013).
The regulatory functions of maritime management personnel are mostly technical
in nature and include inspections, technical survey and certification under the various
relevant IMO and ILO conventions (Mukherjee & Brownrigg, 2013). Therefore, the
human element is indispensable in contributing to the initiation of maritime policy, with
its technical and managerial experience, capable of planning and formulating rational
policy for consideration by the Director-General (Mukherjee & Brownrigg, 2013).
In Jordan particular attention will be given to JMC's strategic plan, its mission,
vision and organizational structure to elaborate on the extent that JMC is the competent
authority in implementing the Casualty Investigation Code. Moreover, JMC is working
to meet its international obligations to ensure maritime safety through its organizational
structure in achieving its vision, mission and objectives that are set out in its laws.
JMC was keen in its vision to establish a maritime sector with a high level of
safety and quality and to open new opportunities for investments (JMC, 2019). JMC’s
mission statement is as follows:
“Achieving the highest International standards for organizing, control and
developing of the maritime sector in Jordan including legislation, transportation
modes, services and human recourses taking into account the protection of the
marine environment and enhancing the maritime safety and security to enhance
the competency of the sector and provide best services to customers" (JMC,
2019).
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The top management level will formulate policy in this matter as to whether it
concerns the ratification of an international convention or treaty by the government. For
this reason, the Maritime Administration has begun to consult with national stakeholders
in public and private sectors (Mukherjee & Brownrigg, 2013).
On one hand, JMC represents the sovereignty of Jordan in the maritime transport
sector as it provides a regulatory environment and further monitors, develops and
maintains the marine environment and raises the level of maritime safety and security in
the maritime transport sector (JMC, 2017). On the other hand, JMC depends on private
entities for certain port operations. For instance, Aqaba Development Corporation
(ADC) is an infrastructure developer, working to create a convenient environment for
investors. Aqaba Port Marine Services Company (APMS) operates pilotage and towage
services. Additionally, Aqaba Company for Ports Operation and Management (ACPOM)
is responsible for establishing, developing, maintaining and operating port activities
(receiving of ships, handling and storing cargo) to provide customers with a complete
package of services to facilitate the customers' cargo operations (JMC, 2017).
The strategic relationship between JMC and the private entities in the Jordanian
maritime transport sector provides clear support for the efforts of the maritime
administration in several important areas such as maritime safety and security, global
connectivity, maritime environment protection, preparedness and emergency response,
and marine services (JMC, 2017). Further, these bodies cooperate to improve the
maritime transport sector in Jordan and raise the bar up high, with a focus on finding a
permanent working mechanism and coordinating periodic meetings to facilitate a
working mechanism between the governments and private agencies involved in
developing the Jordanian maritime sector, especially in casualty investigations (JMC,
2017).
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The organizational structure of JMC was designed by IMOs experts’
recommendation when it was established in 2002, reflecting the functions of maritime
administrations in line with developments in the nature of maritime work and the nature
of the Commission's work to comply with the requirements of IMO to achieve full
implementation of the provisions of international conventions (Hubbard & Hoppe,
2001). The organizational structure of JMC was issued coinciding with the promulgation
of the Organizational Administrative Regulation of JMC No. (65) 2014, in Issue No.
(5291) / the Official Gazette dated 16/6/2014, in which the organizational units in the
structure of the Organization are represented their respective tasks determined. (JMC,
2014).

Figure 3 Jordan Maritime Commission organizational chart
Source: (JMC, 2019)
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As shown in Figure 3, JMC consists of a Board of Directors, Director General,
and Executive Body. The Board of Directors includes the MOT as Chairman, the
Director-General of JMC as Vice Chairman, the Commander of the Royal Jordanian
Navy Force, two representatives of the public sector and two representatives of the
private sector.
In addition, Figure 3 shows clearly the accident investigation division within the
Technical and Safety Directorate. Moreover, according to the job description card of this
division, the main task is supervising and conducting maritime accident investigations
within the territorial waters and on Jordanian ships, wherever they exist (JMC, 2018).
In the last part of this Chapter will address JMC responded to the IMSAS audit
as IMO effective measurement tools. In addition, will highlight the findings and
observation that the audit report mentioned to enhance the Jordan performance regarding
the Casualty Investigation Code.

2.3

Jordan Legal and Institutional Framework after the Audit
It is worth mentioning that Jordan’s maritime administration has undergone the

IMSAS audit. The audit was undertaken from 14 to 23 October 2016. The audit was
conducted through a series of field visits, interviews, and examination of documented
records and databases, and objective evidence, to determine the extent to which JMC has
achieved the objectives (IMO, 2016). The IMO audit report included findings,
observations and corrective actions to help Jordan improve its performance to meet its
international responsibilities and obligations.
The IMO audit report stated that JMC has adopted the Casualty Investigation
Code. However, it was noted that the requirements of this code are not contained in JMC
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Law 46. JMC Instruction 2007 has adopted Resolution A.849 (20) but had not been
amended according to Resolution A.1075 (28) which revokes Resolution A.849 (20)
(IMO, 2016).
In this context, for the purposes of giving full and complete effect to the
provisions of applicable Casualty Investigation Code, the audit team found that there
was no objective evidence to prove that Jordan had a comprehensive policy to support,
implement and enforce the national legislation and regulations (IMO, 2016). See
Appendix 1 (FD-4).
On this occasion, after reviewing and examining the Jordanian national
legislation before IMSAS audit. JMC issued on 31 May 2007 instructions called
“Instructions for Investigation on Maritime Accidents and Incidents, 2007” (JMC, 2007)
in respect to the Casualty Investigation Code, hereinafter called Instructions 2007.
(JMC, 2007).
After IMSAS audit JMC responded to the IMO audit report recommendations
with corrective action and initiated the necessary corrections to improve the discharge of
its duties. To that end, JMC scrambled to issue new instructions. On 16 February 2017,
the Instructions 2017 was issued (JMC, 2017). Instructions 2007 was revoked by
instructions 2017 (JMC, 2017).
By comparison, between Instructions 2007 and Instructions 2017, it has been
observed that Instruction 2007 stipulated eighteen articles in which Jordan has identified
several aspects of the Casualty Investigation Code that meet its national needs and fulfil
its international obligations (JMC, 2007). However, Instructions 2017 just stipulates four
articles as it is: Article 1 states the title of the Instructions 2017; Article 2 states the
definition of the Commission as JMC, the Organization as IMO, and the Code as the
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Casualty Investigation Code. Article 3 states that JMC just shall apply the Casualty
Investigation Code and its rules, and the objectives of the code are an integral part of
these Instructions 2017. Article 4 says that Instructions 2017 revokes Instructions 2007
(JMC, 2017).
According to Abu Zeid (2019)1, it is not necessary, that all provisions of the
Casualty Investigation Code should be stated on Instructions 2017. JMC is convinced
that Article 3 of Instructions 2017 is meet the international obligations and IMO
instruments. Therefore, such as IMSAS audit will not record any findings or
observations that related to Jordan’s implementation of the international Instruments in
the future.
2.4

Summary and Conclusions
Remarkably, Jordan has ratified all the international instruments related to

marine casualty investigation imposed by IMO and ILO. JMC as a maritime
administration provides for both international maritime policy formulation and its
transformation into law, implementation and enforcement. From a practical view, little
attention is paid to national requirements. In particular, when JMC had overlooked the
national needs and striving hard to maintain Jordan reputations at the international level
by issued the Instructions 2017.
The next Chapter will address the current legal and empirical framework in
Jordan. A depth clarification to casualties’ investigations purposes, marine casualty
concept and scope. Moreover, it will discuss the investigation process, methodologies,
and scientific models to help in the investigation. In addition, highlight different States'
perspective in the implementation of the Casualty Investigation Code.

1

Abu Zeid, N. (2019, July 15). Head of IMSAS Committee in JMC. (E. N. Al-Mahariq , Interviewer)
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3.

Chapter 3 Current Legal and Empirical Framework in Jordan

In this chapter will find out how Jordan is implementing the provisions of the
code through highlight Jordan law, regulations, policies, procedures and compare it with
different academic resources and the provisions of the Casualty Investigation Code. In
addition, the authors’ opinions - of the academic resources that used in this study - will
highlighted different ways and forming policies for different States to implement the
Casualty Investigation Code. While perusing and learning these different policies and
national laws in implementing. It should highlight the investigation code to know the
parts of the Casualty Investigation Code.

3.1

Casualty Investigation Purposes
IMO through the Casualty Investigation Code, (2008), adopts international

standards and recommends optimal practices for safety investigation into a maritime
casualty. The Casualty Investigation Code is divided into three parts: Part I, titled –
General Provisions, Part II, titled – Mandatory Standards, and Part III, titled –
Recommended Practices (IMO, 2008).
According to Casualty Investigation Code (2008) - part I, an investigation is
intended to prevent maritime casualties in the future. The code seeks to achieve this
objective through the implementation of a uniform and harmonized approach to
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detecting causal factors that threaten maritime safety. Moreover, the results of reports
should be publicized to the broadest range (IMO, 2008).
When a serious marine casualty occurs, the Casualty Investigation Code will rule
and dominate in respect to any obligation of the flag State to carry out the marine safety
investigation (IMO, 2008). Therefore, identifying the root and immediate factors that
caused the accident in a scientific way through collecting the data, analyzing the
scenarios and identifying the sequence of the event is the necessary way to reduce
accidents and future risks (Roed-Larsen & Stoop, 2011).
The use of adequate measures and a systematic approach may make a major
contribution to diminish the risks or minimize damages or unacceptable major impacts
generated from accidents (Roed-Larsen & Stoop, 2011).
In Instruction 2007, JMC was set out clearly the main objective of conducting
marine casualty investigations in order to prevent future incidents occurring (JMC,
2007). However, after the IMSAS audit it was noticed that Instruction 2017, which is
issued as a corrective action did not mention the purpose for conducting marine casualty
investigations (JMC, 2017).
From the above, the importance of carrying out marine casualty investigations for
developing sufficient measures to prevent and avoid future casualties is understood. The
following sections will highlight by comparing different States and Jordan current
practices on these matters. In particular the marine casualty concept and scope, in both
the mandatory and recommended standards in the Casualty Investigation Code, 2008.
It should highlighted States Such as the Republic of Marshall Island (RMI), the
United States’ (US) Coast Guard, and Poland as a member State in the European Union
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(EU). Whereas, EU regulations apply directly in EU member States. These States
showed a logic implementing and well transforming of the Casualty Investigation Code
provisions into each States’ laws and national regulations to meet the international
obligations and national needs.

3.2

Understanding the marine casualty concept and scope
This part commences with highlight the definition of marine casualty, which

leads to determining the responsibilities of those involved in the casualties or agencies
that have to investigate the accidents. Whereas, the small difference in the given
definitions between the States regulations provokes different responsibilities for the
parties involved in the marine investigation process. Thus, these various definitions lead
to enhancing the understanding of the concept of the marine casualty investigation as a
common process requiring collaboration and coordination among parties.
According to Article 2.9 in Chapter 2 – Definition of the Casualty Investigation
Code, the marine casualty can be defined as any event resulting from an occurrence
linked to operations connected to the ship (IMO, 2008). These occurrences are clearly
stated as loss, death, or serious injury to a person on the ship; the loss, or abandonment
or any material damage of a ship or serious threat to the safety of the ship; ship collision;
severe damage to the environment, caused by a vessel or damage to a vessel (IMO,
2008).
Concurrently, in Article 2.9 of the code excludes any neglect acts or the sequence
of the neglect acts that linked to operations connected cause damage to the ship is not
encompassed under the marine casualty definition (IMO, 2008). In addition, the
Casualty Investigation Code gives specific and clear definitions of serious injury and
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severe damage, to avoid inaccurate implementation of the provisions of this Code (IMO,
2008).
The US Coast Guard identified in its national regulations that the only marine
casualties that it will investigate are reported casualties because the government does not
have the resources to investigate all marine casualties (McNamara, 2016). Therefore, the
US Coast Guard regulations limited the definition the notion of “serious marine
incident” as a marine casualty that caused or linked to a vessel, which is the reported one
(McNamara, 2016).
A deeper understanding of the marine casualty concept and scope clarified the
investigation scope in US Coast Guard. Which ship is applicable to investigate
according to the Casualty Investigation Code in the US? The US Coast Guard has
determined in its national regulations the category of targeted vessels that are
geographically investigated, those include, but are not limited to, US ships anywhere and
vessels flying foreign flags in navigable waters of the US (McNamara, 2016).
The US Coast Guard has not complied with the definition stated in the Casualty
Investigation Code. However, in accordance with its national requirements, the US
Coast Gard laws have adapted the definition to suit what is required in its national needs.
EU is issued directives, which it should need to be transposed into national
legislation of the EU member States as Poland. Article 3.2 of the Directive 2009/18/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009, Says That these terms
“marine casualty, very serious casualty, marine incident, marine casualty or incident
safety investigation, lead investigating State, and substantially interested State” should
be understood according to the Casualty Investigation Code (EU, 2009). As well as,
Article 3.3 of the Directive 2009/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
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of 23 April 2009, Says That “serious casualty” definition should be consistent with the
definition of IMO and that updated with one included in MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.3 (EU,
2009).
Poland is transposed the mentioned above directive into its national legislation.
According to Luczywek (2017), in the Polish Act, Article 2, in the definition of “a very
serious casualty”, a marine casualty implies the death of a person, a vessel total loss and
harmful environmental damage, which has results such as; any damage that makes the
vessel unseaworthy, or causes environmental pollution, or any severe damage requiring
towage the vessel. The Polish Act maintains the definition of a “marine incident” as
stated in the Casualty Investigation Code provisions (Łuczywek, 2017).
Jordan’s regulations do not mention the "maritime accident" or "marine
incidents" concepts because the JMC is content with indicating in the Jordanian
regulation, Article 3, that Jordan applies the Casualty Investigation Code and considers
the provisions of the code as integral parts of the JMC regulations. In other words,
Jordan omitted to set its own definition in harmony with Jordanian national requirements
(JMC, 2017).
From above despite some States replicating the same definition of the marine
casualty concept from the Casualty Investigation Code into their national legislation.
However, these States try to meet international obligations by commensurate with
national needs. The such stated of the marine casualty concept or define the
investigation scope is considered as the right action to ensure the minimum requirements
from the international obligations so even if it is replication so it is enough to let the
national maritime community understand that the State has the legislation that stated the
marine casualty concept and scope.
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From above the right understanding of the marine casualty concept and the well,
define the marine investigation scope lead to an effective investigation. Therefore, each
variation and refinement of the term “marine casualty” will serve a particular national
need and fulfil international obligations. This understanding will help the investigators
to start the effective investigation process and methodology.

3.3

Casualty investigation process and methodology
The investigations of maritime accidents are considered to be more than a means

of identifying the causes of maritime accidents. Rather, the marine accident investigation
is considered as a means of identifying safety deficiencies in the overall management of
the operation from policy to implementation by resorting to the concept of investigation
analysis by applying the clear process and methodologies, which depend on the
scientific methods (IMO, 2008).
Resolution A.1075 (28) on Guidelines to help investigators in the
implementation of the Casualty Investigation Code (Resolution MSC.255 (84))
identifies the extent of the maritime safety investigation by five areas: people,
environment, equipment, processes and procedures, and organization and external
influences. Thus, safety investigations are sufficient to meet maritime safety standards
(IMO, 2014).
By drawing on the concept of safety analysis, IMO has been able to set out in
Resolution A.1075(28), (2014) accident causation models such as a combination safety
analysis and reconstruction of the casualty, that are directly connected with
reconstruction events (IMO, 2014). The resolution A.1075(28), (2014) highlights other
efficiency safety analysis tools, which can be deducted from causation models of
accidents, such as deeper questioning and direct communication and investigation of
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indirect or hidden causes, to enhance the development at all appropriate levels of
effective corrective action (IMO, 2014). However, this resolution does not obligate
States to use specific tools.
Nonetheless, it is known that the investigators may use the accident causation
models to achieve optimal investigation. Then, the main question is whether the marine
accident investigators in JMC apply accident causation models. If the answer is yes,
which models are used? Before elucidating on this, a summary of accident investigation
procedure and methodology will be discussed in general.
Figure 4 shows investigation procedures in line with the Casualty Investigation
Code, according to Soliwoda (2014). Soliwoda undertook preliminary work on the
procedures by dividing marine casualty investigations into three steps. The first step is
data collection, which involves developing a sequence of events through the collection
of information. Subsequently, the second step is the classification of the causation
factors. In this step, the unsafe conditions and circumstances can be identified by expert
investigators by determining the working environmental causation factors. Finally, the
third step is to reduce the possibilities of accidents related to human errors and vessel
machinery by developing safety actions. It is required to identify the possible safety
problems in order to develop safety procedures (Soliwoda, 2014).
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Figure 4: Investigation procedures according to Casualty Investigation Code
Source: (Soliwoda, 2014)

Soliwoda (2014) examines the significance of models in the vessel casualty
process and identifies the major causation factors that might cause identified unsafe acts
to occur. These systematic models, including the SHELL Model, the Cognitive Process
Model, and Marine Root Cause Analysis Technique (MaRCAT), designed by American
Bureau of Shipping (ABS), help the investigators to identify the errors that may be
occurring in the whole process in the system (Soliwoda, 2014).
Cassama (2015) provided an in-depth elaboration of the casualty investigation
process and methods. Initially, the study pointed out that the investigation procedures
begin before the arrival of investigators to the marine casualty scene. A meeting is
initially held to facilitate the exchange of knowledge among investigators and the
development of the investigation plan, especially if there is more than one State
participating in the investigation (Cassama, 2015).
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The collection of factual evidence of importance to the course of the
investigation should be considered. This may include witness statements through
interviews. In addition, a review of records, documents and material evidence, such as
the Voyage Data Recorder (VDR), should be undertaken (Cassama, 2015).
The next step is to assess the factors that contributed to the accident, such as the
safety management system of the ship through its policy and implementation. In
addition, the context of human factors involving interactions among machines, the crew,
and the management system should be considered (Cassama, 2015).
According to Cassama (2015), the root cause of the incident can be identified by
reconstructing and linking events. This is called a sequential description of events to
identify information gaps and inconsistencies in the evidence and factors that
contributed to the accident. It is possible in this step to use different causal models of
accidents as tools for safety analysis. The final version of the maritime safety
investigation report should be released at this stage (Cassama, 2015).
Interestingly, it was observed that whether the investigation is simple or
complex, the investigation model helps to focus on the object of the investigation.
Moreover, the model helps to find out the cause of the accident by direct investigation
using scientific methods (Cassama, 2015). Cassama shows two kinds of investigation
models. The first is the traditional models and the second is the system theory approach.
The most commonly used investigation models are the SHELL model and Reason based
model.
As well as, Article 5.4 - Obligation to Investigate of the Directive 2009/18/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009. In this article, the EU
obliged all investigative bodies in all EU member States to investigate according to the
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common approach adopted. In some cases, to achieve the investigation purposes that
rely on professional judgment can the investigators leave the common approach (EU,
2009).
EU is strived to develop the adopted a common marine casualty investigation
methodology. In pursuant of Article 5.4 - Obligation to Investigate of the Commission
Regulation (EU) No 1286/2011 of 9 December 2011, EU defines the common
methodology is started by operational readiness as a preparedness plan to ensure that
unnecessary delays. Initial assessment and response are considered as a critical step to
quick response with possibilities to minimize losses. Setting out a strategy for scope,
timing, and direction of the investigation to collect the evidence. Moreover, looking for
the proper analysis to identify the causation and other contributing factors to take the
corrective action. Finally, the safety recommendations are highly needed (EU, 2011).
As mentioned above, one phase of marine casualty investigation According to
EU Directives is collecting the data. EU has obliged the investigation bodies for EU
member States to obtain the information from the VDR. Therefore, the investigators
should ensure the VDR information is saved to check all the information related to the
marine accident (EU, 2011). These Directives have been transposed in Polish law in the
following manner:
Strong evidence was observed in the Polish Statute, through a detailed
examination of the casualty investigation process and methods by Łuczywek (2017).
Moreover, the investigation process requires the investigators to go far beyond direct
evidence of the circumstances during the investigation to prevent future casualties. In
addition, the Polish Statute, as well as the resolution A.1075 (28) identify the scope of
any maritime safety investigation by five areas: people, environment, equipment,
processes and procedures, and organization and external influences (Łuczywek, 2017).
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Hence, the Polish Statute illustrates the investigation process, starting with
accessing the location of the maritime accident; collecting the data and making the
proper analysis. Then, a request is made to the chairman of the commission for the
necessary surveys, and permission to conduct the marine investigation. The investigators
should have access to documents, information and data. Furthermore, they should have
the right to copy the important data or take a copy of VDR recorders. The investigators
should interview the crewmembers and employees on board that were involved in the
maritime accident. Finally, information and documents relating to the vessel inspection
should be obtained (Łuczywek, 2017).
In order to reconstruct how a casualty has happened, it is sometimes necessary to
conduct a specialized systematic analysis. For instance, for a specialist analysis of
weather and sea conditions at the time and place of the casualty, the Polish Statute gives
the commission the right to cooperate with institutes such as the Institute of Meteorology
and Water Management – National Research Institute (IMGW) (Łuczywek, 2017).
In contrast, in relation to Jordan’s implementation of the Casualty Investigation
Code, 2008, Jordan has been found to conform to the quality management system
standards

consistent

with

the

management

system

certificate,

International

Standardization Organization (ISO 9001:2015). JMC issued the process manual (2018),
shown in Figure 5, containing the JMC procedures for conducting a maritime
investigation. Sections 049 and 153 of the process manual contain the procedures to
carry out the investigation of a maritime accident occurring in Jordanian territorial
waters or on board a vessel flying the Jordanian flag, wherever it may be (JMC, 2018).
Sections 049 and 153 in JMC Process Manual 2018, indicates that the master,
agent owner, manager, operator, or person in charge of the vessel shall notify the
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administrator in any instance of an occurrence of a maritime accident. The investigator
starts the investigation procedures immediately by gathering the information and
evidence to identify the reasons and the root cause of events to make the proper
recommendations to prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future (JMC, 2018).
Similarly, In addition, the IMO audit report was recommended that JMC should
implement, establishes policies and procedures with respect to the Casualty Investigation
Code and relevant resolutions (IMO, 2016).
Moreover, concerning the information, data or records obtained during the
investigation. The Instructions 2007 stated that this evidence must not be disclosed for
purposes other than an investigation and only with the consent of the party providing the
information. Moreover, JMC decides how much information can be included in the final
report (JMC, 2007). The instruction 2017 revoked the Instruction 2007 in regard to data
and record handling.
The investigator issues the final investigation report and submits the report to the
Director-General of JMC. The report should be entered into the Global Integrated
Shipping Information System (GISIS) - a marine casualty and incident module, and a
hard copy of the final report kept in the directorate archives (JMC, 2018).

Figure 5: JMC procedures to conduct a marine casualty investigation
Source: (JMC, Process Manual, 2018)
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From the previous part of this Chapter, while implementing the documented
investigation process. The investigators should rely on scientific models as Cassama,
(2015) stated a different kind of models such as the SHELL model and Reason based
model. Therefore, for a significant role of these models, IMO resolutions and various
studies regarding the casualty investigation highlighted some models that help the
investigators to find the causation factors that led to a marine casualty.
3.3.1

Casualty Investigation models
To maintain ship safety improvement, IMO adopted a common approach for the

marine casualty investigation process. If each investigator uses an individual approach to
the marine investigation process, standardization of casualty investigations will not be
obtained (Cassama, 2015). Therefore, accident investigation techniques and mechanisms
are adapted by using common methods, which should build on a model to support the
analysis process. This will achieve the goal of unifying investigative methods. One can
also say, the accident causation methods help gather data in conjunction with the
accidents models approach (Cassama, 2015).
To prevent similar casualties in the future, resolution A.1075 (28) was intended
to draw guidelines recommending the States to adopt a systematic investigation of
marine casualties and develop an effective analysis and preventive action (IMO, 2014).
Thus, a significant definition of “casual factor” was illustrated in the Casualty
Investigation Code (2008) as actions, neglect, events, circumstances causing a marine
casualty, or marine incident to occur or probably occur as well as the adverse
consequences linked with the marine casualty or marine incident (IMO, 2008).
The Casualty Investigation Code was not limited to this definition. It also defined
the five terms, the contributing factors, safety deficiency and issue. That affects the
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sequence of events leading to a casualty occurrence, and how it should be classified
using the five terms, as shown in Figure 6 (IMO, 2014).

Figure 6: A sequence of events leading to a casualty occurrence
Source: (IMO, 2014)

A Danish accident that occurred on 15 July 2009, elaborates the necessity to
identify the causal factor is an increasingly important reason to apply the investigation
Models. The primary purpose is to prevent recurrence of similar accidents when the
investigators identify the causal factors. For instance, according to Hedlund (2017), this
accident that occurred during the passage of the Baltic Sea. The accident resulted of two
seamen died from carbon monoxide poisoning. Because of a lack of ability to identify
the causation factors and no indication of wrongdoing, the investigation was closed.
Moreover, the investigation findings were kept out of reach (Hedlund, 2017). Therefore,
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no lessons were learned, and other fatal accidents later took place in Denmark (Hedlund,
2017).
The majority of maritime casualties are caused by human factors/errors. To
investigate the root causes related to the human factor (Lee, 2016), the SHELL model,
used in the data collection phase, and the Reason Hybrid model, used in the analysis
phase, are highlighted.
The SHELL model deployed by The International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) is a simple model to provide assistance in investigating the effects of human
error on the maritime casualty, describing and building an understanding of how the
human element interactions with technical systems components. SHELL stands for
Software, Hardware, Environment, Liveware (central component), and Liveware
(peripheral). Therefore, this model can be used to provide guidelines on where the
investigators should look for evidence. It helps with the “who”, “where”, and “what”
(Lee, 2016).
The Reason Hybrid Model is an epidemiological model that focuses on analysing
the “How” and “Why" to identify the unsafe conditions considered causation factors that
contributes to the maritime casualty. This model uses the data collected by the SHELL
model concerning the event and circumstances in relation to five elements: decision
makers, line management, preconditions, productive activities, and defence (Lee, 2016).
The IMO audit report advised Jordan to determine and assign responsibility for
the development of methodologies and evaluation criteria to give full implementation to
the applicable Casualty Investigation Code (IMO, 2016). Therefore, the IMO audit
report recommended that JMC should establish a policy consisting of guidelines,
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processes, procedures, and key performance indicators, combined with a Quality
Management System (QMS) (IMO, 2016).
JMC’s procedure for conducting a maritime investigation is shown in Figure 5.
However, the stated procedure is superficial and ambiguous. For example, it requires
analyzing the root causes of the marine casualty, without specifying procedures or
providing models for the conduct of such an analysis (JMC, 2018).
The investigation models in IMO Resolution and the Casualty Investigation
Code is stated clearly. In spite of that, the evidence presented in this section suggests
that JMC’s process manual 2018, tries to determine its casualty investigation process
and methodology superficially. Moreover, far too little attention has been paid to state
the casualty investigation process even in the national regulations or clarify it more
accurate in the JMC process manual.
After the investigators defined, the causation factors that led to the accident by
collected the data and analyzed it based on the scientific models. The investigators now
are ready to write and prepare the casualty investigation report. This report should
comply with the Casualty Investigation Code and the related resolutions.
3.3.2

Casualty Investigation Report
Timely and accurate marine casualty reporting as a remedial action is an

important part in the casualty investigation process and plays a key role in improving
maritime safety to prevent and reduce anticipated risks resulting from similar accidents
in the future (Łuczywek, 2017).
The Casualty Investigation Code deals with the marine safety investigation
report through the mandatory part and the recommended practices part. The mandatory
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part obliges each State to send a copy of a draft marine investigation report to whoever
is interested, giving them thirty days to comment. This includes stakeholders such as the
flag State of the ship or the coastal State involved in the casualty or whose environment
was damaged by a marine casualty. In addition to that, a State that has lost the lives of
its nationals or a state with any other reason considered significant by the marine
casualty investigation may comment on the report. However, when the 30 days has
expired, no comments will be considered (IMO, 2008).
It is worth mentioning that the IMO sought opportunities to learn lessons from
marine incidents, casualties and accidents. IMO circular MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.4 requires
that the final marine safety investigation report be entered for on-line reporting directly
and electronically into the marine casualties and incidents module in GISIS (IMO,
2013).
Each State is obliged to submit the final copy of the investigation report to IMO
for each investigation into a serious marine casualty or a casualty or incident other than a
serious casualty that may prevent a similar casualty in the future. This report shall be
available to the public with details (IMO, 2008).
According to Łuczywek, (2017) The Polish Law 2012 abides by the Code and
show strong transformation for the International obligations into the Polish legislation.
More detailed in the legal provisions to oblige the investigation body, which is the
Commission, to prepare and publish the final marine casualty report. Moreover, define
the structure of the report to include the basic facts injured persons, environment
pollution, flag State of the vessel, classification society, operator and the owner of the
vessel, and vessel information such as the size and the crew member information. In
addition, to be included are the accident sequence description, the models and methods
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used for the analysis to define the causation factors and the results and safety
recommendations (Łuczywek, 2017).
The EU Directive 2009/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
23 April 2009, says that under this Directive shall ensure the accurate and timely
reporting. This investigation should not determine any blame or liabilities. However,
shall be proposed remedial actions (EU, 2009).
One of the significant issues in Poland is transposed, EU Directive 2009/18/EC
into the Polish Law. The Polish Law stated in the provisions, is that the marine casualty
report should be published within twelve months of the marine casualty. Moreover, the
report should not consider as evidence in criminal or other proceedings (Łuczywek,
2017). The Casualty Investigation Code states that the investigation report is not aimed
at determining blame or liability (IMO, 2008). In case of safety deficiencies creating
serious risk, the investigators immediately inform the responsible party, so the risk can
be managed. (Łuczywek, 2017). Moreover, the Commission follows up every
recommendation after submitting the final report and promotes positive safety actions
taken by making it public (Łuczywek, 2017).
Formerly in Jordan, JMC Instruction 2007 stated that it is obligatory to send a
copy of the final report of the marine casualty investigation to the relevant States and to
IMO (JMC, 2007). However, the Instructions 2017 did not mention any specific or clear
provisions obliging the JMC to send a copy of the final investigation report (JMC,
2017).
However, it is mentioned in the Process Manual 2018, that the investigators
should prepare a marine casualty investigation report and submit a copy to the Director-
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General of JMC and a copy to IMO, by submitting the report to the GISIS module
(JMC, 2018).
Additionally,

the

IMO

audit

report

recommended

that

the

safety

recommendations of the final investigation report be publicized and the investigation
report submitted to IMO through the GISIS Module (IMO, 2016). See Appendix 2 (FD8).
According to JMC investigation records, the investigation division of JMC has
carried out 34 safety investigations (JMC, 2019), published no (0) marine safety
investigation reports to JMC’s website and submitted two safety investigation reports to
the GISIS module (JMC, 2019).
Another major source of uncertainty is in the way a marine casualty investigation
report is used in Jordan. If we look at Poland how dealt with the EU Directives and the
Casualty Investigation. Poland has stated the marine casualty investigation report more
accurately in Polish law. This way gives the impression of effectiveness in the
implementation and stresses the extent of Poland’s commitment to the code provisions.
In contrast to the Polish case, Jordan dealt with the code through one-provision, stating
that Jordan is obliged to follow the requirements of the code. However, Jordan does not
refer to the investigation report in its law or regulations generally or in detail. Only the
JMC process manual refers to the obligation to prepare an investigation report without
indicating any details such as the type of accidents or ship type.

3.4

Summary and Conclusions
As noted from above, Jordan, represented by JMC as the maritime

administration, did not establish a specific definition of maritime casualties. It merely
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stated one provision, namely that the code is an integral part of the marine investigation
instructions in Jordan. Therefore, JMC has left the involved entities to interpret and
estimate the provisions of the casualty investigation code in a way that suits them. For
instance, it would be difficult for them to know how marine casualties are defined or
which casualties JMC would investigate.
However, it is noted from the practical cases discussed above that some States
have clearly stated the definition of marine casualty, and specified which cases require
investigation in their national regulations and law in accordance with the national
requirements of the State. Consequently, these States are clear and firm in their
regulations, demonstarting their committment to abide by the national regulations and
fulfil their international obligations.
As for the investigation process and methodology, Jordan has shown
documentation of the investigation process in the approved processe manual 2018,
which is a positive aspect. However, when the logs of investigation process were
reviewed, it was noted that JMC did not document in detail its procedures of any of the
models for determining causation factors in a maritime accident. Thus, without working
and inference by these systematic and scientific models, which is recommended by IMO
in its resolutions, it would be difficult for marine investigators in Jordan to identify the
causation factors of an accident.
At the end of this Chapter, it was discussed that Jordan, as a member State, has
not fully complied with the decision of the IMO convetions and resolutions to provide it
with marine investigation reports or at least to publish them on the JMC website to
disseminate maritime safety recommendations.
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The investigation process and methodologies should be implemented effectively.
Therefore, there are many factors that should be considered to achieve the main aim
from the marine investigation. The next Chapter will address the contributing factors
that influenced marine investigation.
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4.

Chapter 4 Contributing factors in marine investigations

To carry out the maritime accident investigation process and come up with a
final report requires suitable maritime safety recommendations that help to prevent the
recurrence of marine casualties in the future. In this case, the investigation process
requires some factors to have an effectiveness investigation. For example, it should be
an accredited body that carries out the responsibilities of the marine casualty
investigation process in which maritime investigators are competent, experienced and
have the necessary authorities or delegations to enable them to implement and meet the
international State’s obligations of the requirements of the Casualty Investigation Code.
These factors are stated in the provisions of the Casualty Investigation Code.
Thus, this Chapter will address these factors, whose presence is seen as a contribution to
the success of the marine casualty investigation. Moreover, this Chapter will address
Jordan’s status with respect to these factors to fulfil its obligations. Moreover, the
Chapter discusses how some other cases have provided these factors to facilitate the
casualty investigation process and have fully met their international obligations by
implementing the Casualty Investigation Code.
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4.1

Casualty Investigators
In the view of Nuutinen & Norros (2007), the nature of carrying out an

investigation process is described as a retrospective process (Nuutinen & Norros, 2007).
In other words, a primary concern involves rebuilding the sequence of events. To that
end, key abilities in respect of identifying the root causation leading to a maritime
casualty are being knowledgeable about data collection and evidence-gathering
mechanisms and interview techniques as well as methods of analysis by identification of
human and organizational factors and by applying the casual factor models to marine
accidents (IMO, 2014). This investigation process requires a qualified, well-trained and
competent marine investigator to be able to achieve a systematic investigation to
improve maritime safety and prevent similar casualties in the future (IMO, 2014).
IMO in the Casualty Investigation Code and related Resolutions does not specify
the type or quality of the training or the degree of the qualifications that the investigators
should possess. It only states that they should be adequate and sufficient to the marine
casualty areas. This has been left for each State to decide according to its national
capabilities (IMO, 2014).
So far, two factors have been identified as being potentially important:
qualifications and sufficient training. IMO is keen in the guidelines Resolution
A.1075(28) to assist investigators in the implementation of the casualty investigation
code. For qualified and well-trained investigators, the marine safety investigation body
should set out a specialized training program (IMO, 2014).
Article 10.3(g) - EU Directives 2009/18/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 23 April 2009, says that EU member States should provide relevant
training for the investigators (EU, 2009). A notable example is Poland by transposed the
EU Directives into the national legislation and was more precise and detailed in terms of
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determining the qualifications and degree of education and what specialization of the
qualification the maritime investigator must hold. Furthermore, it specifies what
knowledge the investigator must possess in safety of navigation and protection of the
marine environment, with at least five years’ experience, to be a member of the
commission formed to investigate a marine casualty. In addition, it is important that the
investigator be a Polish citizen, have the full legal capacity and not be guilty by final
judgment of any crime intentionally (Łuczywek, 2017).
Similarly, Jordan has set out the qualifications of the marine investigator at the
JMC to have a Master’s degree in maritime affairs or marine qualification, either first
marine engineer or master or second marine engineer. Moreover, the investigator should
have serviced as a marine engineer or master on board a merchant’s vessel for fifteen
years and had experience as a flag State surveyor or port State officer for at least one
year (JMC, 2018).
In addition to the above criteria, JMC stipulated that the investigators which
likely will hire should have sufficient knowledge of the laws and regulations issued by
the IMO. This condition is stated in the job description card, that is issued by JMC and
accredited by the Civil Service Bureau (CSB). The CSB is the responsible body for
managing human resources and organizing the governmental employee's affairs in
Jordan (JMC, 2018).
To ensure the effectiveness of the investigation process according to the Casualty
Investigation Code, the administration is entitled, if it deems necessary, to use
temporarily qualified and expert investigators or use consultants to obtain expert advice
on any aspect of the marine safety investigation. Those experts should investigate in
accordance with the Casualty Investigation Code (2008).
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This can be seen in RMI; the RMIs’ maritime regulations generally determine
that the deputy commissioner with supervisory expertise and carrying out a maritime
investigation retains the full powers to assign an officer for the purpose of carrying out
the marine investigation (Republic of Marshall Island, 2015). As necessary, the RMI
maritime regulations state that to obtain additional assistance, get technical advice or
assist in the Investigation, the senior deputy commissioner or the deputy commissioner
may appoint individuals, organizations or agencies with the appropriate expertise
(Republic of Marshall Island, 2015).
The presence of specialized, qualified and experienced investigators contributes
greatly to the effective investigation in general (Roed-Larsen & Stoop, 2011), whereas
the lack of these factors, whether the expertise in the field, specialized and continuous
training in modern investigative techniques may hinder the investigation (Roed-Larsen
& Stoop, 2011). As a result, the effectiveness of the investigation will be significantly
affected, jeopardizing the main objective of ensuring maritime safety (Roed-Larsen &
Stoop, 2011).
It is worth mentioning that JMC instruction 2007 stated that a committee formed
of members including investigators of JMC, a member of the Royal Jordanian Navy
Force and an investigator from ACPOM carries out investigations of marine casualties
on a small ship. Moreover, the JMC Director-General shall be entitled to seek such
assistance, as deems appropriate to assist in the investigation if required (JMC, Marine
Investigation Ins., 2007). However, this article no longer exists in the new instructions
2017 issued by JMC (JMC, Marine Investigation Ins., 2017) after the IMSAS audit in
2016.
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According to Salman (2019)2 the Director of Technical Affairs and Marine
Safety Directorate, JMC shows that in some investigation cases, such as the M/V Pella
investigation (JMC, 2011) a temporary investigator or private company can be hired to
assist with issues related to VDR (Salman, 2019). However, after checking to try to find
a provision in the JMC's laws, regulations or procedures, there was no evidence
mentioned in relation to the opportunity to have external assistance in conducting a
marine casualty investigation.
JMC has benefited from training courses, and programs offered by maritime
organizations specialized in training, whether IMO or European Maritime Safety
Agency (EMSA), to ensure maritime safety. Therefore, JMC has dispatched its only
marine investigator to attend specialized training courses and workshops in the maritime
field. For this matter, the training records related to the marine investigator were
reviewed in JMC (JMC, 2007-2019). It was noted that the total number of training
courses held and utilized during 2018-2019 was four comprehensive training courses in
various maritime topics through external courses and workshops (JMC, 2007-2019).
IMO audit report 2016 recommended that JMC should ensure the impartiality of
the investigation by exclusive investigators properly trained and supported by sufficient
resources (IMO, 2016).
In JMC, a holistic approach is utilized by integrating investigator qualifications
and sufficient training to meet its obligations in respect to the Casualty Investigation
Code 2008. This finding may help to understand that Jordan has a strong point in the
marine investigation.

2

Salman, M. A. (2019, July 15). Director of Technical Affairs and Marine Safety Directorate. (E. N. AlMahariq, Interviewer)
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4.2

Casualty Investigation Body

4.2.1

Power of the investigators
According to the Casualty Investigation Code, (2008), all States shall provide in

their national laws to ensure investigators that perform a maritime safety investigation
have the authority and powers to carry out their duties and accomplish the investigation
process. This includes the ability to board the vessel and meet the master, crew and any
other involved person to obtain evidence for the purpose of the investigation without any
hindrance (IMO, 2008).
A qualified and well-trained investigator will not be able to carry out the
investigation to facilitate and meet the State's obligations with respect to the Casualty
Investigation Code requirements without adequate human and financial resources (IMO,
2008).
According to Polish law, the Commission, which carries out the investigation, is
obliged to investigate every serious injury. After a preliminary assessment of the causes,
the Commission has the right to decide either to proceed or to abandon it. When making
a decision, it shall take into account the seriousness of the accident, the type of the
implicated vessel or cargo, and whether the results of the investigation shall contribute
in the future to the prevention of marine accidents (Łuczywek, 2017).
As a good case that shows the importance of drawing the lines of power through
the regulations, we recall the case of the RMI. Under RMI Law, it has been generally
indicated that marine investigations are carried out in RMI under the RMI Maritime
Regulations, which are promulgated under the Maritime Act 1990 of the RMI and issued
by the maritime administrator. The RMI marine investigations are aimed to enhance the
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safety of life, property, and marine pollution at sea by preventing offences, marine
incidents, marine casualties and future accidents (Republic of Marshall Island, 2015).
The Maritime Regulations in RMI limit some of the investigator's powers by
stating certain functions and excluding others. For instance, in dealing with original
equipment and documents, the investigator shall not be authorized to take them off a
vessel unless the marine safety investigation authority. The body responsible for
carrying out the investigation in RMI indicates fundamental legal reasons for why it is
necessary to take the original documents or remove equipment from the vessel (Republic
of Marshall Island, 2015).
The enactment and enforcement of the international instruments through national
laws, is giving the States the power and the authorization to ensure the maritime safety
by implementing the casualty investigation procedures (Pomeroy & Earthy, 2017). This
is evident in both cases Poland and RMI because they have clear and explicit articles in
the regulations. However, does this mean the limitation of some powers or
authorizations of the investigators are considered as a weak point in some casualty
investigation regulations? Of course, the answer is no. The existence of explicit legal
provisions, this will give the powers to all parties involved in the investigation process,
whether they are managers of the top levels, investigators, master of the ship or the
crewmembers. This leads to a clear understanding of the responsibilities assigned to the
investigators. In this case, there will be no lack of awareness of the responsibilities
assigned and does not lead to nescience in practicing the roles.
In Jordan, according to Article 20, JMC Law 46 states that for the purpose of
implementing the provisions of this law, the Director-General of JMC, or the employee
commissioned by him, shall be considered a Judicial Police authorization. Moreover,
this provision in the JMC Law 64, grants the investigators the power to inspect and enter
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anywhere in the ports and on board ships and review the documents and express
reservation on any of them (JMC, 2006).
However, under Jordanian governmental policies, the elements of this doctrine
were established in a different way. It is generally thought that the decision of the
Jordanian Prime Ministry started the development of good faith in economic
performance in Jordan. The council decided to adopt a policy of rationalization and
adjustment of expenditures, including travel expenditures, in all governmental bodies’
budgets, including JMC budget. (Prime Minister Council, 2017).
According to (Abu Zeid, 2019), such a decision has limited the investigators'
ability to travel to investigate any maritime casualty occurring on board a vessel flying
the Jordanian flag in another coastal State. The procedure to travel for the purpose of
investigating on board a Jordanian vessel in another country will require a lot of time to
obtain permission. Abu Zied (2019) also stated that in such cases, the Jordanian flag
State must request a copy of the investigation report from the coastal State involved in
the marine casualty.
Despite the Judicial Police authorization was granted to the investigators in
Jordan. The investigators will not be able to investigate a national ship that involves
accidents in international waters. Interestingly, the authorization granted to the
investigators in Jordan was observed to be limited.

4.2.2

Independent Investigation Body
The importance of the investigative process and the noble goal of increasing

maritime safety. The independence and objectivity of the investigators are also
considered to be major and pivotal aspects related to the marine casualty investigation
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process. The objectivity factor is deemed as an influencer that may affect the
investigation and thus depart from the main objective of the investigation report
(Syafiuddin, 2016).
IMO has made a recommendation in Part III on recommended practices, Chapter
16 - principles of investigation according to the Casualty Investigation Code, (2008). It
is stated that the investigation body should be independent to ensure the free flow of
information during the marine casualty investigation; such an investigation should be
independent and impartial. To ensure this result, the investigators must be functionally
independent of the parties involved in the maritime incident, independent from judicial
proceedings, independent from anyone who may take rigid action against individuals or
organizations linked to the maritime incident (IMO, 2008).
These investigators according to the recommendation of the Casualty
Investigation Code, (2008) should also be free from any intrusion with deference to the
investigation process (IMO, 2008), which is illustrated in Chapter 3.1: Casualty
investigation process and methodology.
According to Syafiuddin (2016), a conflict of interest might exist if the maritime
administration, as a regulatory body, is likely to conduct the casualty investigation. This
is because the maritime administration may be related to the involved entities being
investigated, which is an obstacle to their independence and objectivity as an
investigative body (Syafiuddin, 2016).
Some states have adopted and maintained the principle of independence and
objectivity by forming independent investigative bodies in their governments, as Poland
and Indonesia have done.
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In this aspect, there are no conflicts of interest within the investigating body in
Poland. The Parliament of the EU obliges the Member States to establish an independent
and impartial investigation body to conduct marine safety investigations, with the
necessary powers and resources (EU, 2009). Poland, in 2013, complied with the
directives of the EU as a Member State and established an independent body called
“Państwowa Komisja Badania Wypadków Morskich” [the State Marine Accident
Investigation Commission] (Łuczywek, 2017). Therefore, Poland provided a prominent
example in making the responsible body to carry out a casualty investigation by forming
a lasting and independent body, which consists of five members appointed for five years
(Łuczywek, 2017).
This trend has also been applied in Indonesia since 1999, where an independent
body separate from the maritime administration has been established to conduct casualty
investigations, called KNKT [Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi]. KNKT is
under the responsibility of the MOT, but the Minister has no authority to intervene in its
investigations (Syafiuddin, 2016).
In Jordan, as shown in Figure 7, the Accident Investigation and Marine Incidents
Division reports to the Technical Affairs and Maritime Safety Directorate, which in turn
reports to JMCs' Director-General and then the Minister of Transport (JMC, 2014). The
Accident Investigation and Marine Incidents Division has no independent decisionmaking power but must seek permission or approval from the higher levels in the
hierarchy.
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Figure 7: The investigation body hierarchy in JMC, part of the organizational chart
Source: (JMC, 2014)

IMO audit report 2016 also indicated that there was no evidence of independence
or impartiality measures concerning investigators and investigations conducted by JMC
(IMO, 2016).
Roed-Larsen and Stoops’ (2011) study have shown that institutional and
administrative relationships between different entities may restrict the independence of
the investigation. In addition, the study shows that this issue is found in modern
investigations in various fields of transport, whether maritime or aviation or land or
related to any various sectors.
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In some rare cases, Even the State provided an independent body for the
investigation. However, the States should be careful about how to ensure the impartiality
for the investigators. It should be noted; this independence poses a major challenge in its
continuity in maintaining the independence and the absence of any external influence
affecting the integrity of the independence factor of these institutions (Roed-Larsen &
Stoop, 2011). For instance, The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in the US
was established as an independent body under the Ministry of Transport (Forbes, 2011).
However, some political appointments interests have influenced the selection of judges,
which in turn, affected the objectivity and independence of this institution (Roed-Larsen
& Stoop, 2011).
The question remains in this study, whether Jordan’s investigation body should
be independent or non-independent? It is highly recommended to make the Marine
Accident and Incidents Investigation Division an independent body from JMC.
Therefore, it is essential to provide impartiality and objectivity for the investigators to
carry out the investigation process and contribute effectively to the real purpose of the
marine casualty investigation process.
The IMSAS audit report recommended that JMC should undertake initial work to
separate the investigation functions from JMC in order to demonstrate impartiality and
independence in marine casualty investigations. To that end, JMC proposed the creation
of a marine casualty investigation unit in the MOT (Abu Zeid, 2019). One can also say
that the accident investigation division is still non-independent because the division is
within the Technical and Safety Directorate (JMC, 2014).
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4.3

Cooperation Casualty Investigation
Preliminary work on co-operation in the marine investigation was undertaken by

IMO through Article 10.1 from Chapter 10 Co-operation of Casualty Investigation Code
(2008). IMO recommended that to the extent practicable, all interested States shall
cooperate in marine safety investigations (IMO, 2008).
The Gulf of Aqaba, as shown in Figure 8, has significant importance to four
countries: Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and Egypt. The total coastline for the Gulf of
Aqaba is 385 kilometers, and the boundary is divided roughly between the countries.
Egypt has the longest coastline, with 200 km. Saudi Arabia’s coastline is 150 km.;
Jordan’s is 25 Kilometers, and Israel’s is only 10 km (Rumley & Minghi, 1991).

Figure 8: The Gulf of Aqaba region
Source: (Rumley & Minghi, 1991)
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According to Rumley & Minghi (1991), Jordan is among the four countries most
reliant on the Gulf of Aqaba since it is the only seaport to Jordan. The other outlets of
Jordan are landlocked, and their route to the Mediterranean is only through the other
countries, Lebanon, Syria and Israel (Rumley & Minghi, 1991). Despite, the political
and economic conditions surrounding Jordan, Jordan has turned this single port into
strength and used its tiny coastline as a lifeline by increasing its imports and exports and
the prosperity of economic growth through the port of Aqaba (Rumley & Minghi, 1991).
It can be seen from Figure 8, showing the Gulf of Aqaba’s border landscape,
which any marine casualty that occurs outside the Jordanian territorial waters will be
very close to the territorial waters of one of the other three countries. As such, the
cooperation in marine casualty investigations will be an essential common opportunity
for all these interested States to achieve maritime safety through establishing a regional
marine accident investigation center in the Gulf of Aqaba (Salman, 2019).
To demonstrate the essential role of cooperation in investigation, after the
Estonia disaster in 1994, the accident investigation system at the EU level revealed
weaknesses in identifying and reporting the causes of marine accidents as well as a lack
of cooperation between the maritime administrations of the EU Member States.
Therefore, to ensure the harmonization of investigation procedures and methods,
cooperation and uniform solutions were established among the EU Member States by
creating legal standards for casualty investigations. The European Parliament and the
Council adopted Directive 2009/18/EC on 23 April 2009 to establish the fundamental
principles governing the investigation of accidents in the maritime transport sector
(Primorac, 2018).
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4.4

Summary and Conclusions
This Chapter addresses several contributing factors, which are stated in the

provisions of the casualty investigation code. These factors are considered to be the
essential reasons for the success or failure the investigation process and to the
achievement of the main objective of the marine casualty investigation process itself.
These factors mentioned above are, first, primarily for marine investigators with
respect for two major areas of qualifications and adequate training. The second pertains
to the independence of the investigation body and whether it has sufficient powers to
make the proper decisions related to conducting investigations or not, without the
presence of any external influences from entities related to the investigation. The final
factor is the extent of the role of cooperation in casualty investigations among States.
By comparison to the other states discussed above, in terms of impartiality,
objectivity and independence measures in maritime investigations, there is still no
evidence of a clear policy in Jordan to implement and enforce the standards of the
Marine Casualty Investigation Code. Thus, there are no fundamental changes between
Jordan before the IMSAS audit and Jordan after the IMSAS audit. At this point, Jordan
still faces challenges to improve its performance.
In Jordan, despite the endeavors exerted in fulfilling its international obligations,
there have been some disruptions in the attempts to implement the provisions of the
casualty investigation code. For instance, despite granting their investigators judicial
police power. However, due to some governmental decisions, there are insufficient
financial resources to facilitate marine investigations. On the other hand, Jordan has
strong points. This can be seen clearly in the first factor, the maritime qualifications and
training of investigators. Additionally, Jordan has an opportunity to exploit its
geographical location in the Gulf of Aqaba, shared with three other coastal States.
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5.

Chapter 5 Analysis and Findings

Jordan faces several challenges, such as fluctuation in its external and internal
conditions and context. This study seeks to provide answers to these challenges.
Therefore, a content analysis of the strengths (S), weaknesses (W), opportunities (O) and
threats (T) (SWOT) analysis have been carried out to determine whether Jordan is
implementing the Casualty Investigation Code and meeting its obligations to the fullest
extent. The analysis is summarized in the SWOT Matrix (Table 1) below.

Strengths
Which factors support the implementation of the Casualty Investigation Code in
Jordan. What are the existing advantages?

1. Ratification of all the relevant international maritime conventions, codes,
and protocols.
After reviewing the institutional and legal framework, and the international
instruments that have been ratified by Jordan, it can be concluded that Jordan has
acceded to all the international maritime instruments related to marine casualty
investigations.

2. Provision adequate specialized training
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Effective training in respect of the responsibilities and modern investigative
methods pertaining to the Casualty Investigation Code was observed. Therefore,
qualified, proficient, competent and experienced investigators are provided by JMC.
JMC provides investigators with adequate specialized training to investigate based on
scientific methods.

Weaknesses
What could be improved? What is not done properly? What should be avoided?
What obstacles prevent progress? Which elements need to be strengthened?

1. Lack of meeting the national requirements in the marine casualty
investigation instructions.
JMC, as a governmental body, plays the legislator, regulator and supervisor of
the maritime sector. At this point, the issuance of the local maritime legislation is
extremely important in enforcing the relevant international instruments signed by
Jordan.
In addition, the national bodies in the maritime sector in Jordan, considered as
JMC stakeholders, are not required to read the international instruments. Thus, these
national entities will be looking for the Jordanian national legislation issued by JMC that
governs the investigation of marine casualties, which is expected to deal with and
regulate the current situation in Jordan.
This finding has important implications for changing the marine casualty
instructions from Instruction 2007 to the new Instruction 2017. For instance, there is a
lack of a specific provision defining the purposes of carrying out a marine casualty
investigation in the national legislation in Jordan.
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2. Lack of specific and clear investigation methodologies.
Neither the Instructions 2017 nor the JMC Process Manual 2018 mentions that
the marine casualty investigation process in Jordan is based on any scientific models or
systematic methods that should be used for the investigation of marine casualties. In
fact, the investigators in Jordan have sufficient training and they had the maritime
knowledge in the casualty investigations, the knowledge is identified in this case implicit
knowledge. However, JMC should consider this knowledge, and training should be
documented in the instructions nor the process manual according to ISO standards to
become an explicit knowledge.

3. The investigation division is a non-independent body.
According to Abuelenin (2017), the requirement for an effective marine casualty
investigation is to ensure effective marine safety investigation and to support the
independence of all parties involved in the investigation. Therefore, the investigation
shall be carried out by another administration (Abuelenin, 2017).
Despite the recommendation of the IMO audit report 2016 and the initial effort
made by JMC on 24 December 2018 as a corrective action by suggesting the separation
of investigation duties, the JMC still has a non-independent marine casualty
investigation body.

Opportunities
Where are the chances to enhance the current practice? What benefit can occur?
1. Regional harmonization
Jordan is located on a cargo transit corridor; the Aqaba port is a gateway for the
transit goods to neighboring countries. Moreover, it is considered as a major center for
Jordanian maritime trade in exports and imports. Therefore, the investigation of marine
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casualty accidents and the development of policies to reduce incidents and accidents in
the Jordanian territorial water is an important factor to ensure maritime safety.
The main challenge pertaining to international casualty investigations in the Gulf
of Aqaba is the need for international harmonization under conditions of common
approaches in order to comply with quality and credibility standards.
All States that share the Gulf of Aqaba are members of IMO, and all of them are
supposed to implement their international instrument obligations in respect of marine
casualty investigations. This is an opportunity for Jordan to initiate bilateral agreements
with each State in the Gulf of Aqaba, establish a regional center for marine casualty
investigation, and efficiently and effectively respond to any maritime casualty, accident
or incident.

Threats
What obstacles are found in the current implementation of the Casualty
Investigation Code in Jordan?
The current practice is subjected to considerable threats that restrict the full
implementation of the Casualty Investigation Code, such as poor implementation or
misdirected practices.
1. Insufficient financial allocations
The Jordanian government’s policy decisions such as reducing financial
expenditures lead to fluctuations in JMCs’ budget. Insufficient financial allocation
hinders the investigation process. In addition, this will lead to a failure to provide
adequate financial allocations to implement the Casualty Investigation Code and affect
the employment policy for the recruitment of highly qualified investigators.
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2. Shortage in effective implementation of international codes
Abuelenin (2017), based on two case studies on improving special measures for
marine accident investigation procedures, indicated that the reason for the insufficient
maritime accident investigation is the shortage in applying international regulations
related to maritime safety, and a lack of legal measures (Abuelenin, 2017).
A marine casualty investigation based on scientific and systematic methods will
structure the investigation process and enhance the identification of causes, drafting the
report based on the integrity of findings and the validity of recommendations (RoedLarsen & Stoop, 2011).
Table 1 SWOT Analysis

Strengths

Opportunities

‐ Ratify all the international maritime
conventions, codes, protocols.
‐ Provide adequate specialized training.
Weaknesses

‐ Regional harmonization.

Threats

‐ Lack
of
meeting
the
national
requirements in the marine casualty
investigation instructions.
‐ Lack of specific and clear investigation
methodologies.
‐ The investigation division is a Nonindependent body.
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‐ Insufficient financial allocations.
‐ Shortage in effective implementation of
international codes.

6.

Chapter 6 Recommendations

The aim of this dissertation is to expose inadequacies in the current implementation
of international and national casualty investigation legislation in Jordan. It was observed
through the review of law, regulations and instructions of various States that the States
differ in the way they implement their international obligations in relation to the
provisions of the Casualty Investigation Code. Moreover, it has been observed that the
power and the extent of the authorization in the implementation of some of these
regulations come from the accurate statement of the provisions of the Casualty
Investigation Code in their national regulations. In other words, Jordan should set out
detailed national regulations that give an accurate reading of the state's understanding of
the provisions of the Casualty Investigation Code.
The efforts made by Jordan to adopt the Marine Casualty Investigation Code to
enhance marine safety standards might not be enough to the extent that the country
needs to further effectively and adequately implement the international instrument. The
IMO IMSAS audit of 2016 reveals that there is still significant room for improvement.
In particular, and in order to ensure the objectivity and impartiality of casualty
investigations, Jordan should respect the independence and impartiality of investigators.
JMC should strive hard to ensure an independent body to conduct marine casualty
investigations. Such a status of independence should be measured against legal,
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financial, organizational and sufficient resource indicators. Thus, this challenge of
independence entails another challenge, which is to ensure the continuity of this
independence without any political influence or consideration.
Systematic and organized training and competence development have mainly been
the responsibility of JMC. Jordan has shown full interest in investigator training.
Another challenge facing Jordan is the development and implementation of basic,
coordinated and high-level training courses for investigators. Moreover, an important
factor is the ability to identify training needs and to utilize training programs from
competent international institutions in maritime safety. Transforming implicit expert
knowledge into explicit knowledge happens by disseminating the training and
knowledge provided to the investigators
Jordan must strive to be the first to initiate a regional center for the marine casualty
investigations in the Gulf of Aqaba; consequently, there will be a significant opportunity
for the exchange of experience among the marine investigators of all the States.
Regional cooperation at an efficient and effective level will enhance maritime safety in
the Gulf of Aqaba.
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